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An "Authentic Wholeness" Synthesis of Jungian and 
Existential Analysis 
Samuel Minier 
Wittenberg University 
Eclectic approaches to psychotherapy often lack cohesion due to the focus on technique and procedure rather than theory and 
wholeness of both the person and of the therapy. A synthesis of Jungian and existential therapies overcomes this trend by 
demonstrating how two theories may be meaningfully integrated The consolidation of the shared ideas among these theories 
reveals a notion of "authentic wholeness' that may be able to stand on its own as a therapeutic objective. Reviews of both 
analytical and existential psychology are given. Differences between the two are discussed, and possible reconciliation are 
offered. After noting common elements in these shared approaches to psychotherapy, a hypothetical therapy based in 
authentic wholeness is explored. Weaknesses and further possibilities conclude the proposal 
In the last thirty years, so-called "pop 
psychology" approaches to psychotherapy have 
effectively demonstrated the dangers of combining 
disparate therapeutic elements. 	 While eclectic 
psychotherapy is associated with experienced clinical 
work (Norcross & Prochaska, 1988; Sue, Sue, & Sue, 
1994) and professionally encouraged (George & 
Cristiani, 1995), eclecticism also lends itself to 
haphazard and ineffective integration of therapeutic 
techniques (Brammer & Shostrom, 1984; Norcross & 
Prochaska, 1988; Patterson, 1980), as well as the 
adoption of "every new and dramatic in thine" 
(George & Cristiani, 1995). 
When bits of psychotherapies are thrown 
together without any cohesive theoretical background, 
the human being can only be understood as a simple 
collection of separate processes. 
	
Effective 
interventions become just tricks used to influence the 
client's actions or thoughts, and the therapist turns into 
a mechanic, trying to fix the malfunctioning machine 
that is the client (Franld, 1975). 
If psychotherapy is not just about "curing the sick" 
but about understanding human existence, then the 
therapist must enter a relationship with a client as one 
who attempts to peer into a client's experience and 
world. Of all psychological therapies, existential 
psychology is unique in that it grew not just from a 
clinical attempt to understand the mentally ill but from 
many philosophical attempts to know life. Despite 
some differences, these understandings all center on 
the concept of the entire person and the process of 
living, or "being." Being is not a convenient construct 
with which to cure clients; rather, it is the basis of 
existential thought. 	 While most therapies use 
specialized technique to achieve understanding, 
existentialism argues that understanding must occur 
before technique can arise (May, 1983). 
Of course, this lack of tight theoretical 
constructs is precisely why existentialism is criticized_  
Van Dusen (1962) cautions that the differences among 
existential theorists are vital to the understanding of 
existentialism, that "[when] existential philosophy has 
hardened into a consistent dogma, life will have gone 
out of it and existentialism will have lost its center in 
Man" (p. 29). Similarly, May argues that the decision 
to become an "existential analyst" does not involve 
renouncing other views in psychology: 
The existential approach is not a system of 
therapy-though it makes highly important 
contributions to therapy. It is not a set of techniques- 
though it may give birth to them. 	 It is rather a 
concern with understanding the structure of the human 
being and his experience (1962, p.185). 
May's statement is an open invitation for an 
eclectic blend of existentialism and other 
psychotherapies. A frame of reference that makes 
existentialism more accessible and understandable 
would certainly be beneficial. However, a "cut and 
paste" approach is not the answer. For a coupling of 
existential ideas with other theories to be useful and 
valid, common links must already exist, and the 
additional theory must also stress the totality of the 
individual's experience and the importance of the 
therapist/client relationship. 	 Of the many 
psychotherapies that address such issues, Jungian 
psychology in particular has previously been noted for 
its striking similarities to existentialism. As A.J. 
Ungersma, a proponent of logotherapy (Frankl's 
existentialism) stated, "since Jung early in the 
twentieth century defined neurosis as the suffering of a 
soul that has not found its meaning,' we could call Jung 
the first logotherapist!" (1961, p. 34). 
An integration of Jungian and existential 
ideas is a warranted and appropriate vision of eclectic 
psychology and therapy, for three reasons. First, the 
basic concepts of both systems are very similar or often 
identical; the manner in which these concepts are 
described is the dividing point between Jungians and 
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existentialists. Second, these different concepts can be 
used to complement and balance each other. The 
Jungian portion of this synthesis expresses existential 
ideas and terms in a therapeutic framework that is both 
substantial and malleable. The existential portion 
helps translate concrete bipolarization such as the 
unconscious, introversion/extroversion, and archetypes 
into fluid notions that are more adaptable to individual 
cases. Roger Brooke (1991) has argued that this is in 
fact what Jung intended his ideas to be, but that he 
lacked the "conceptual tools to express his insights" (p. 
2) in such a manner. 
Finally, this synthesis is not a random 
conglomeration of two theories but rather a reuniting 
of ideas that support and reinforce each other; thus, a 
basic concept which unites these two approaches to 
psychology arises in their joining. At the core of both 
existential and analytical psychology lies a notion of 
awareness and gathering of the separate parts of one's 
existence into an interconnected reality, an "authentic 
wholeness" that may serve as a hallmark of mental 
health. 
Bibliography of Theories 
In order to better understand analytical and 
existential psychology, a review of the two theories 
follows, each theory in terms of three categories: 
psychology, psychopathology, and psychotherapy. This 
is by no means a comprehensive review. Those 
wishing to examine Jung more thoroughly are referred 
to Jung (1933; 1961; 1964), as well as Read, Fordham, 
and Adler (1957). In addition, Samuels (1985) offers a 
rich collection of material on new directions in 
analytical psychology. For a greater exploration of 
existentialism, begin with Laing (1960), Ruitenbeek 
(1962), Boss (1963), and Bugental (1965). 
Jung's Psychology 
Jung views the psyche as extremely intricate, 
a multidirectional, multi temporal region (Rychlak, 
1981). To understand this complicated structure, Jung 
uses two main principles to categorize the mind into 
manageable chunks: constellation and opposition. 
Jung feels that ideas, beliefs, and assumptions about a 
particular subject would constellate around a specific 
emotion; these constellations, or complexes, are the 
units through which the mind constructs the world 
(McAdams, 1994; Rychlak, 1981). 
However, opposition is also necessary to 
understand a concept because "one end of a spectrum 
helps to define the other" (Samuels, 1985, p. 92). One 
such opposition is the distinction between conscious  
and unconscious. The images and contents in the 
conscious are more or less clearly defined, whereas the 
material of the unconscious is vague and unclarified 
(Rychlak, 1981). However, conscious and unconscious 
are equal, both in ability to understand and in ability to 
provide guidance. 
Just as each individual has a conscious and an 
unconscious, mankind also has an awareness and an 
unawareness of material both within and beyond each 
person. 	 Jung speculates that the collective 
unconscious, this innate understanding of the world 
shared by all people, was responsible for the recurring 
themes in myths and stories (Jung, 1961, 1964). The 
images around which these themes congealed are the 
archetypes. Some archetypes reside specifically within 
each individual, such as the persona - one's appearance 
to the world - and the shadow - one's hidden, 
undesirable side (Jung, 1964; Samuels, 1985; 
McAdams, 1994). 
Jung emphasizes a principle of equivalence to 
moderate between this constellation and opposition 
(Rychlak, 1981), . Many complexes should be present, 
with no one dominating the individual's psyche. 
Likewise, bipolarization in life needs to be balance. 
One of the most important balancing acts takes place 
between ego (self-perception) and shadow (self-
deception), so that these opposites are reconciled in an 
accepting manner (Read, Forham, & Adler, 1957). 
Only by integrating complexes, opposites, and 
archetypes together can one become a whole, unified 
person, what Jung called the Self (Jung, 1933, 1964). 
Jung's View of Psychopathology 
Jung sees a patient as "one who [had] betrayed his 
wholeness in the interests of some sub-aspect of 
himself' (Barton, 1974, p.95). This betrayal may occur 
in several ways. An overinflated complex may 
consume more and more of a person's time and energy, 
or the bipolarization in one's life may be so strongly 
separated from each other that they become 
incompatible (Rychlak, 1981). 	 However, the 
undifferentiated unconscious, in the natural striving for 
balance, pushes repressed issues upward to break into 
the unconscious. If the material can be integrated into 
one's understanding, the Self may be attained. This 
material is usually understood through a symbol. 
The unconscious information may be too 
repellant or inconsistent with one's self-understanding 
to be accepted. 	 Projection and other defense 
mechanism may be used, so that the notion is cast 
away from the self and onto another object; this object 
becomes a symbol of the unwanted knowledge. Thus, 
part of the Self is denied. 
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Jung's System of Therapy 
Samuels (1991) argues that terms such as 
"mentally ill" result in a loss of patient individuality 
and true patient understanding. Similarly, Jung writes 
that, "we should not try to get rid' of a neurosis, but 
rather to experience what it means, what it has to 
teach, what its purpose is . 	 " (1964. P.170). Barton 
also states that "the purpose of Jungian analysis is to 
make conscious that which is unconscious and to bring 
into the open that which has been shut off' (1974, 
p.110). In other words, analytical psychology sees 
"mental illness" as an indication that the patient is 
attempting to become whole. 
To ease this "opening-up," Jung envisions 
four stages to therapy: (a) confession, (b) elucidation, 
© education, and (d) transformation (1933). 
Confession is a catharsis in which one becomes aware 
of unconscious knowledge. Elucidation involves a 
clarification of this material and a discovery of what it 
means to the individual. Education is a changing 
process focused on both the "mental illness" and the 
behaviors that facilitate it. 	 Transformation is a 
specialized fourth stage that addresses the total 
development of the Self. This sequence is only a 
sketch, for it is likely that portions of all four stages 
will be occurring simultaneously (Rychlak, 1981). 
Jung comments that, "it is advisable for the physician 
not to have too fixed a goal . . . the shoe that fits one 
person pinches another" (1933, p. 60). Instead, the 
focus should be placed on the dialectic relationship 
between patient and therapist, a "symbolic soul 
meeting" (Barton, 1974; Rychlak, 1981). 
The necessity of treating each case differently 
leads Jung away from devising specific therapeutic 
techniques. Jung feels that all psychic material was 
wrapped around symbols, so patients are encouraged to 
write, draw, and act in other manners that generate 
unconscious imagery. The resulting imagery should be 
focused on and intensely amplified. Within a dialectic 
relationship, these examinations reveal unconscious 
meanings and how to create a whole from them. 
Existential Psychology 
Existential psychology began as a reaction to 
the objective views that dominated psychology 
(McAdams, 1994). The existential psychologists, 
despite varied interests and techniques, all believe that 
psychology's starting point must be the individual. 
Existentialism rejects the fragmentation of the 
individual into separate components and sections; 
instead, the entire process of what it means to be 
human must be considered. Binswanger uses the term  
Dasein to describe "a being whose essence is to be-in-
the-world" (Needleman, 1963, p. 67). This "being-in-
the-world" means that the world and the individual 
have no meaning without each other (McAdams, 
1994). 
If being-in-the-world characterizes human 
existence, then a notion of non-being must be 
considered, for "to grasp what it means to exist, one 
needs to grasp the fact that he might not exist" (May, 
1958, pp. 47-48). Death or non-being is an utter lack 
of Dasein, a Nothingness that produces Angst, the utter 
fear of separation and non-existence (Ruitenbeek, 
1962). 	 Angst is inevitable and, ironically, both 
threatening and necessary. 
Man's awareness of being and non-being is 
needed to comprehend his "thrownness," the condition 
that he is indifferently cast into and out of the world 
(Bugental, 1965). However, this awareness of man's 
condition reveals also his potential for action. 
Ultimate control is not attainable, but man does have 
the freedom and responsibility to make authentic 
choices within his thrownness (Bugental, 1965; 
Rychlak, 1981). Authenticity is "a way of being in the 
world in which one's being is in harmony with the 
being of the world itself' (Bugental, 1965, p.33). 
Existential Psychopathology 
The recognition of uncertainty and 
thrownness is likely to cause existential anxiety, which 
is simply characteristic of being. Existential anxiety is 
normal and health if " lone can} accept the 
responsibility for choice but recognize the potentiality 
of tragedy" (Bugental, 1965, p.24). When existential 
anxiety cannot be accepted, that anxiety becomes 
neurotic. Though conceptualized in different ways, 
neurotic anxiety in general may be understood as a fear 
of Dasein loss. Some may suffer from a "stuck" 
Dasein, in which the freedom to make decisions is 
gone (Needleman, 1963); others may feel ontological 
insecurity, in which they cannot take existence for 
granted and contrive ways of forcing life to be more 
"real" (Laing, 1960). In addition, neurotic anxiety may 
also be caused by a perceived inability to understand 
and interact in the world, what Frank! called "the 
existential vacuum" (1975, p. 90). In these different 
manners, the "mentally ill" inauthentically perceive 
their world and deny the true possibilities of their 
Dasein. 
Existential Therapy 
In existential psychology, terms such as 
psychopathology are seen as dehumanizing labels 
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(Bugental, 1965; Laing, 1960). Instead of a cure, 
existential psychotherapy is understood as a quest for 
the authentic being-in-the-world that the patient has 
lost. Implicit in this search is the client's personal 
discovery of Dasein. The therapist may guide and 
encourage, but it must ultimately be the client who 
regains his or her Dasein. This involves many tasks 
the client must complete, including recognizing the 
inauthenticity of his/her current world-view and taking 
the responsibility to make his/her own personal choice. 
Because of the emphasis on each client's Dasein as 
unique and specific, few generalizations can be made 
about therapy. Any general, formulaic approach to the 
client is seen as a devaluation of the experiencing 
relationship between client and therapist. 
Some attention has been paid to the 
"procedure" of creating what Bugental calls "the 
authentic presence" of the therapist in relation to the 
client. Whatever techniques the therapist chooses to 
use must deepen the understanding between therapist 
and client. May writes that, "psychological dynamisms 
always take their meaning from . . . the patient's own, 
immediate life" (1983, p.154). Similarly, Bugental 
addresses the need for the therapist to understand that 
immediate life without taking away the patient's 
responsibility for the existential crisis intimately 
(1965). 
Jung and Existentialism 
It is important to note that the proposed 
synthesis is not an attempt to "weld together" Jung and 
existentialism into one large personality theory. The 
constructs underlying the specific components of 
personality within each theory are unified and 
contained so that additions would be confusing and 
often contradictory. Nonetheless, the understandings 
of the two theories in relation to the basic nature of 
human beings are very similar and seem to present a 
notion of "authentic wholeness" as the key to a healthy, 
well-balanced life. 
In addition, both analytic and existential 
psychologists emphasize the importance of addressing 
the individuality of each client's "authentic wholeness" 
in clinical practice. 	 It is through this specific 
understanding that these approaches may be united. 
Differences 
The main point of divergence between Jung 
and the existentialists lies in their manner of 
theoretical conceptualization. Existential writings are 
often phrased in ways that can only be fully understood 
when applied to particular examples. For instance,  
how can one define Dasein in general? While the 
phrase 'being-in-the-world" is useful, a general 
understanding of the idea remains elusive. In contrast, 
the Jungian divide psyche and experience into many 
distinct sections through the principles of constellation 
and opposition. Rigidly defined structures such as the 
complex or the personality types may result in a 
narrow or limited examination of personality and 
pathology. 
So, if these theories seem to have authentic 
wholeness at their core, how should their divergent 
approaches be studied? That is, should existentialism 
be examined for its undifferentiated Jungian ideas, or 
should analytical psychology be scrutinized for 
constrained elements of existentialism? While both 
perspectives are useful, the primary examination will 
be of Jung's complicated and confusing taxonomy in 
relation to the existential ideas that flicker in and out 
of his work. It is difficult to address existentialism's 
lack of concrete categories when existential 
psychologists cite this "deficiency" as a benefit to their 
system. Jung, on the other hand, addresses the need 
for a phenomenological understanding of each 
individual, coupled with the scientific division of 
knowledge, what Brooke (1991) calls "the Cartesian 
separation of Knower and known" (p. 6). 
Existential examples of this division (e.g., 
Franid's psychogenic, somatogenic, and noogenic 
neuroses) effectively demonstrate the importance of 
conceptual categories. For better or worse, Western 
science has developed in this classifying manner, and a 
rejection of this approach would be counterproductive. 
However, Jung is often criticized for hinting at an 
innate human experience that is beyond scientific 
understanding and yet at other times wrapping it 
completely within scientific reductionism. This dual 
presentation of what Brooke (1991) calls "the natural 
scientific" and "the poetic" often causes confusion and 
rejection of Jungian ideas among both psychologists 
and the general public. 
Jung's unclear blend of phenomenology and 
rationalism produces several results. Existentialists 
have turned away from Jung's ideas due to a perceived 
overemphasis on the reality of concepts and symbols. 
The terms "libido" and "psychic energy" seem tied to 
biological drives and are reminiscent back to Freud's 
notions of reductionistic determinism (Brooke, 1991). 
Furthermore, Brooke contends that Jungian analysts do 
not often attempt to reconcile Jung's two views: 
Although Jungian analysts tend to eschew 
reductionism (or at least that is the impression they 
like to give) there does seem to be a widely held view 
that the "truths" which emerge from analytical 
practice are in some sense provisional (1991, p. 5). 
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In addition, a popular aspect of Jungian psychology, 
the personality typology, is also one of the most 
objectifying. The very characteristics that make it 
appealing to empiricists and the public are the same 
characteristics that clash with existential ideas and 
even with some of Jung's other writings (Jung, 1933). 
This "confusion through conceptualization" is 
readily evident in two specific areas of analytical 
psychology. One is the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious. Existentialism resists the personal 
unconscious as an objective reality because the 
difference between conscious and unconscious is, from 
the existential point of view, an arbitrary dividing line 
(Rychlak, 1981). 	 Furthermore, relying on the 
unconscious for guidance seems an inauthentic way of 
life, a forsaking of choice for innate "instincts" and 
"drives" (Rychlak, 1981). Binswanger argues that 
emphasis must remain on the conscious as the primary 
force in activating the human experience (Needleman, 
1963). 
Similarly, Boss comments that it is 
"unnecessary to go beyond immediate experience" 
(1963, p. 94); labeling something unconscious is 
attempting to understand that which does not exist, for 
as soon as it exists (i.e., is known to us), then it must 
be conscious! In other words, there may be such a 
thing as the unconscious, but it is concealed from our 
understanding, so we should "let concealment be the 
secret it is" (Boss, 1963, p. 101). 
If the personal unconscious is a vague 
unawareness that we cannot define, then the collective 
unconscious and the archetypes within it are simply 
subjective misrepresentations of "Dasein-experiences" 
common to many people (Boss, 1963). To the 
existentialists, the emphasis must remain on each 
unique, existing Dasein; if some individuals 
throughout history have experienced being in the same 
way, there is no need to consider the source of these 
commonalties as shared. Such a collective force 
appears to be the equivalent of species instincts. Such 
a notion angered Frank!, who, when addressing the 
religious elements of the archetypes, wrote: 
What sort of religion would that be - a 
religion to which I am driven, driven just as I 
am 	 driven to sex? As for myself, I would 
not give a damn for a religiousness that I 
owed to 	 some "religious drive" (1975, 
1164)- 
To be authentic, intensely personal experiences such as 
religion must come from "the personal center of the 
individual man rather than an impersonal pool of 
images shared by mankind" (Frank!, 1975, p. 65). 
Possible Reconciliation 
Some have suggested that Jung's confusion 
and contradiction springs from his sometimes dull and 
complicated writing style (Brooke, 1991). However, an 
even more basic problem may be that Jung simply gets 
tied up in his terminology. Brooke writes that, "Jung 
saw and understood as an existential phenomenologist 
but he lacked the conceptual tools to express his 
insights in a phenomenologically rigorous way" (1991, 
p.2 ). Jung was witnessing integrated phenomena in 
people but had no way of expressing these views except 
through the natural scientific understanding that 
dominated the time. 	 Such views cannot fully 
encompass notions of balance and experience, even 
symbolically. 
This does not mean, however, that these 
"empirical" understandings of authentic wholeness 
should simply be ignored. Rather, such constructs 
should be used as broad categories for understanding 
phenomena rather than interpreted literally. Jung is 
inconsistent on this subject, but it seems clear from his 
later writings that he encouraged latitude within a 
defined theory: "Naturally, a doctor must be familiar 
with the so-called methods.' But he must guard 
against falling into any specific, routine approach" 
(Jung, 1961, p.130). Jung's ideas can be used as tools 
through which the analyst may begin to understand the 
patient. However, the therapists should never try to 
force the patient's experience into a construct that does 
not fit him or her. Jung's conceptualizations are 
simply meant to be stepping stones leading to the 
meeting of therapist and client as two equal human 
beings. (Jung, 1961). 
An ironic example of the power of Jung to dig 
into the heart of a matter is Peterson's (1992) use of 
personality typology to examine differences between 
Jung and Frank!. Peterson argues that the theorists' 
differing views on the discovery of meaning can be 
better understood when one recognizes Frank! as an 
extrovert and Jung as an introvert. Both Jung and 
Frankl believe that "meaning is found, not invented" 
(Peterson, 1992, p.37); the difference is that they 
looked in different areas. Jung searched for the nature 
of meaning inside each person's psyche, while Franld 
emphasized commitment to something outside the self. 
Thus, there is not a choice between Jung's meaning or 
Franld's meaning but a recognition that "each type, 
giving true testimony of its own perception, will have 
two different stories to tell" (Peterson, 1992, p. 37). 
Not only does Peterson offer a connection between 
Jung and Frank!, he also shows how a typology can be 
used without being restrictive. Jung and Frankl are not 
simply labeled "introvert" and "extrovert" but are 
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understood through these terms, which in turn leads to 
greater understanding. 
In this light, the examination of the 
unconscious becomes more than a reliance on blind 
instinct and a rejection of independent free will. Boss's 
(1963) argument that the complexities of 
"concealment" (the unconscious) should be left secret 
prevents the experiencing being from delving deeper 
into his/her Dasein, from examining the parts that 
cannot be fully understood. However, these confusing 
experiences may eventually make sense. Van Dusen 
writes, "What to most analysts is unconscious and thus 
removed, to the existential analyst is present though as 
yet undifferentiated" (1962, p.37). The implication is 
that the elements of the unconscious are very much 
part of one's being. What is undifferentiated may 
eventually be fully understood or integrated into the 
personality: "[for] Jung, the unconscious is that 
absence which nevertheless calls for appropriation so 
that the one-sidedness and limitations of consciousness 
may be compensated" (Brooke, 1991, p. 135). Jung's 
understanding of the unconscious is unclear and often 
overstated, but his contribution that unawareness may 
become known, and thus balanced with previous 
awareness, is valuable. 
Again, in the case of the collective 
unconscious and the archetypes, Jung's contradictions 
do not warrant outright rejection. Jung's basic mistake 
is his failure to consistently delineate the archetypal 
image, which may vary, from the archetype itself 
(Brooke, 1991). If this distinction is kept in mind, the 
archetypes lose their concrete separateness from 
individual experience and become ontological "sources 
of the typical actions, reactions, and experiences that 
characterize the human species" (Brooke, 1991, p. 
159). 
In this understanding of the archetypes, there 
is no need for Franid's bristling against "drives," 
religious or otherwise. Just because there are basic 
functions through which the - human psyche 
understands or the Dasein experiences does not mean 
that an individual's relationship to God, Mother, or the 
Hero lacks an intrinsically personal nature. Rollo May 
recognizes that it is a basic part of being-in-the-world 
to symbolize experience through myths, which are 
innately archetypal: "Each of us, but virtue of our 
pattern of myths, participates in these archetypes; they 
are the structure of human existence" (May, 1991, p. 
38). 
Commonalties 
When Jung's ideas are understood as general 
experiences that differ in specifics through each  
person's being, a greater understanding of the total 
human experience is gained. 	 From such an 
understanding arises practices and ideas that 
emphasize both analytical and existential psychology's 
contributions to psychopathology and therapy. The 
guiding point of these contributions should be the goal 
of therapy. Both Jung and the existentialists state that 
while each individual's needs will differ, all people 
strive to make sense out of their place in the world. 
While Jung talks about meaning gained 
through myth (Jung, 1961), and Frankl discusses 
meaning gained from suffering (Frankl, 1969), both 
are discussing a need for people to understand 
themselves and their world. As Peterson (1992) points 
out, Jung focuses inward and Frankl aims outward, but 
both emphasize each individual's finding authentic 
meaning in his or her own way. 
This reliance on the Self to find meaning, as 
from one's conscious, also generates anxiety. Jung and 
Sartre agree that such an existence is often filled with 
anguish (Shelburne, 1983). This anguish over the 
search for Self and meaning can lead to self-deception 
and a rejection of one's responsibility for this search. 
Some people may form complexes around the 
hardships in their lives, and others will live "in bad 
faith" by allowing popular opinion to determine their 
decisions; in both cases, the individual is neglecting 
self-unification and self-with-world unification. 
Through individuation or authentic living, 
anguish is confronted, and "it is in the confrontation 
with the shadow that the person must face 
inconsistencies in his value structure. Through this 
process bad faith would be exposed and worked 
through" (Shelbourne, 1983, p.64). Only through the 
individual's realization of Self as both cause and 
potential cure of his/her misery may authentic 
wholeness be reached. 
For those who cry out for help on this journey 
to authentic wholeness, Jung and existentialism 
caution the helper (the therapist) to recognize fully 
what the client is: a human being as potentially strong 
or weak as the therapist. Such a similar being must be 
treated with the respect due to an equal. As 
Binswanger states, "[the therapist] will therefore not 
degrade the patient to an object toward which he is 
subject, but he will see in him an existential partner" 
(1962, p. 20); analytical psychology aims at a similar 
relationship, in which "patient and therapist sit 
together, walk and talk together . . . and engage in a 
wide variety of activities in which they ask themselves 
what is the truth of the patient's life" (Barton, 1974, 
p.112). The therapist may have greater training or 
knowledge than a client, but the therapist never 
presumes to understand the client better than the client 
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does him/herself. Thus, the emphasis focuses back on 
the patient. 
Guided and encouraged by the therapist, the 
client makes these discoveries through a variety of 
exercises, the specifics of which vary from patient to 
patient. In analytical therapy, this involves attaching 
significance to "symbols of unification" (Barton, 1974), 
while existentialism stresses the exploration of 
meaning in actions involving one's being (Frankl, 
1969). In both cases, the essential nature of the client's 
actions involves a "development of inner resources" 
and "creative exercises of freedom" (Shelburne, 1983, 
p.58). The patient is encouraged to create and examine 
symbols and meanings in life. 	 For example, 
perspectives of dreams in each theory are viewed from 
each particular patient's Self or Dasein so that, except 
for slight amplification, the dream means exactly what 
it appears to mean for each client (Barton, 1974; 
Binswanger, 1962). It is through such intensive 
examinations that the client can exercise the free will 
to discover the meaning in his/her Dasein or Self. 
An Authentic-Wholeness Model of Psychotherapy 
Behind the differences and agreements of 
existentialism and Jung, there is a unified theme, a 
notion of "mental health" as existing within the 
authentically-whole person. What might therapy that 
focused on this idea look like? Who might benefit the 
most from it? It seems likely that an authentic-
wholeness approach would best suit those who suffer 
from what Jung called "the general neurosis of our 
time" (1933, p.61). Disintegration of the self, a feeling 
of inability to function in the world, a longing for 
fulfillment: all these phrases may describe those who 
could benefit. Disorders of anxiety and affect certainly 
fall into this realm. However, as will be discussed 
later, this theory of treatment may not work well with 
those whose psychopathology involves severe delusion 
or psychosis, for in these situations the necessary 
interaction with the therapist may not be possible. 
At the beginning of authentic wholeness 
therapy, a connection between therapist and client 
must be established. The client must understand that 
s/he will be as responsible for the direction and 
progress of the therapy as the therapist. The therapist 
may have an idea of how the journey to the client's Self 
should proceed, but the therapist makes no 
assumptions that will overrule the authority of the 
client. The therapist should expect the treatment to 
roughly follow Jung's four stages of therapy. 
However, to some extent, the steps will also 
occur continuously, and the therapist must be aware of 
this. Suppose, for example, a client with a compulsion  
for hand-washing begins to identify the compulsion 
with a fear of being regarded as dirty by others 
(elucidation) and yet also recognizes the dirt and sweat 
on his hands as a natural part of himself (a symbol of 
transformation and integration). The therapist must 
allow the patient the freedom to both elucidate and 
transform but must also stress the importance of truly 
breaking the compulsion and the danger of substituting 
a lowered self-esteem (a unipolar symbol of Dirt as 
Self) for the compulsion. In this manner, the therapist 
allows the client to maintain his equal partnership in 
the relationship while not denying the therapist's role 
as "meaning-transformer" in therapy (Barton, 1974, p. 
268). 
Careful work by client and therapist is 
necessary through the confession stage of the therapy. 
The true heart of the client's problem needs to be 
reached in this stage, for only when both parties in the 
therapeutic relationship are aware of the true nature of 
the problem can the place of inauthentic or partial 
wholeness in the client's life be understood (Jung, 
1933). The therapist must be especially attentive in 
this section of the therapy, so that a superficial aspect 
of far greater neurosis is not mistaken for the source of 
the client's suffering (Jung, 1933). Once this source 
has been pulled out and is examined by therapist and 
client in the elucidation and education phases, the 
freedom and responsibility of the client should be 
encouraged frequently. 
The client needs to understand that s/he has 
the ability and indeed the duty to accept and 
understand this "neurosis" in the most authentic 
manner possible. This can be the first step in finding 
integrated, connected meanings in the other 
experiences of the person's experience or Self. 
In the search for meaning, the therapist is 
likely to see the client wrap understanding of a person, 
experience, or Self around some object (Jung, 1964). 
This is not a bad thing, since the client is aware that 
this symbolism is occurring. For example, if a client 
ties the mean, nasty acts of his childhood to his older 
brother, the patient is in effect casting his undesirable 
Shadow onto the brother. Even if the brother did have 
a corrupting influence, both client and therapist need 
to realize that his symbolism is actually a rejection of 
the integration of Shadow and Self. Such a projection 
must be worked through by constantly pushing the 
client to be responsibly authentic and not use freedom 
of choice to ignore an aspect of Self (Frankl, 1969). 
However, the therapist must also be careful 
not to push the client away from a symbol that the 
therapist does not personally agree with, particularly in 
matters of religion (Jung, 1933). The understanding of 
authentically appropriate symbols for the client can 
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only be reached through an equal and open dialogue 
between client and therapist (Bugental, 1965). 
Symbols of authentic wholeness can be 
generated and explored through several processes, such 
as dream amplifications, painting, and writing. The 
emphasis on material that comes from the individual 
enforces the client's notion of Self as creator and finder 
of meaning (Read, Fordham, and Adler, 1957). Again, 
the therapist must be careful not to view the dreams or 
other unique work from a pre-designed frame of 
reference. The only frame of reference through which 
these works can be understood is the client (Jung, 
1933; May, 1991). 
These activities are the first steps toward the 
achievement of authentic wholeness. This 
involves the integration of the various symbols and 
meanings that have been discovered into one complete 
Self. The unification of the Self, however, is not 
attainable without a conscious decision by the client to 
do so. The elements that rise from the unconscious 
mean nothing if the client does not have the free will 
and courage to face them. This transformative stage 
may take a long time to reach. 
Authentic wholeness therapy, like Jungian 
and existential analysis, may be a long, time-
consuming process. However, not all the client's work 
must be done with the therapist. If the client moves 
into the transformative stage and is actively pulling 
together the parts of his/her existence into a 
consolidated meaning, s/he may be ready to 
discontinue therapy while continuing to become 
authentically whole. 	 Such a decision must be 
discussed between client and therapist. Authentic 
wholeness is not just a goal of therapy but also a goal 
of healthy life overall. Ideally, the client will continue 
in these explorations long after treatment has ended. 
Conclusions 
The previous speculations about an 
"authentically wholeness" - based therapy are just that: 
theoretical speculations that have yet to be empirically 
validated. For that reason, several weaknesses within 
these ideas are evident. As stated earlier, authentic 
wholeness therapy may only be appropriate for certain 
populations. The severely mentally ill may have 
extreme difficulty understanding notions of "integrated 
experience," and thus are not potential clients for this 
therapy. As both Jung (1957) and Laing (1960) point 
out, there may be important symbols and elements of 
existence present in the seemingly random acts of a 
schizophrenic. However, schizophrenic delusions and 
other profound disturbances are probably not reachable 
by the outlined model (i.e. the confessional step). This  
limitation is particularly frustrating because it is often 
the extremely mentally ill who are most dehumanized 
in their treatment. 	 Further research in the 
understanding of the severely delusional will be 
necessary before an approach to their authentic 
wholeness may be undertaken. 
The degree of Self-disorganization presents 
another potential flaw. Therapists who are concerned 
with over-influencing the client's experiences and 
symbols may place too much emphasis on choice and 
responsibility early in the therapy. 	 For clients 
disconnected from themselves and their existence, this 
challenge may be too much for their limited resources. 
These patients should be slowly integrated into a plan 
in which both their efforts and the therapist's have 
equally important consequences. This also brings up 
the consideration of time. 
The journey toward authentic-wholeness may 
require a longer time commitment than many patients 
and therapists desire. The is of time should be 
carefully considered by both parties before therapy is 
entered. 
Finally, the lack of case studies for this 
hypothesis is possibly the greatest weakness. Without 
specific features, the general notion of "authentic-
wholeness" is a hazy one that may edge toward the 
"plug-in" eclecticism which was criticized earlier. 
Case studies, by providing concrete examples of 
concepts, would be the best way to address this 
problem. Future investigation and clarification of 
authentic-wholeness may open the avenue for 
empirical research. 
In spite of these weaknesses, the proposed 
integration shows potential for further study and 
consideration. The reasons for continued exploration 
of authentic wholeness are threefold. First, it offers a 
potential new therapy for both clients and therapists 
who want a treatment that centers around the whole 
individual. Second, this hypothesis highlights a notion 
that helps explain and clarify two often-confusing 
theories. Even if authentic wholeness therapy is 
ineffective, further explorations of similarities between 
analytical and existential psychology could continue to 
illuminate both theories. Finally, this hypothesis is an 
example of eclecticism in which the theories are not 
randomly tossed together but are instead carefully 
studied for similarities. 
Once such similarities are discovered, 
subsequent empirical work may strengthen this united 
base. Hopefully, this notion of authentic wholeness 
addresses not only the necessity of wholeness of the 
client, but also wholeness of the therapy as well. 
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